he Cold War is over. Ask Americans of our generation if communism is still a threat to American peace and security, and chances are they’ll say no. The Bush administration, despite having its hands full with Iraq and its War on Terror, still feels the need to portray left-leaning Latin American countries as threats to American trade interests. Last week was a perfect example of the current state of relations between the U.S. and the poster boy of Latin America’s new left, Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela. Venezuela arrested an American naval attachÉ on spying charges, and the U.S. expelled a senior Venezuelan diplomat in retaliation. There was also a tense (and sometimes bizarre) exchange of words earlier last week that featured Venezuelan vice-president Jose Vicente Rangel calling President Bush a “North American Hitler” and Condoleezza Rice a “delinquent” and an “arms dealer.” The Venezuelans are afraid that the U.S. is planning an overthrow of their government, and the Americans fear a hostile socialist government in their resource-rich backyard. This pattern, if less extreme in other nations, is familiar throughout the region.

Of course, this is nothing new. Americans have been involved in Latin America ever since the‘23 Monroe Doctrine, and blatant intervention reached its height in the “splendid little war” of‘98. The United States sent Teddy Roosevelt and his “Rough Riders” to roam around Cuba and fight the Spanish, and though they mostly got sick with yellow fever, the war ended with Cuba effectively becoming a U.S. Protectorate. The next century continued along the same lines, though with more subtle “dirty wars,” like the Reagan administration’s Contra scandal. Perhaps it’s because these countries are right in our own “backyard” that we feel the need to periodically intervene when we feel that our security is threatened. Yet, our southern neighbors have never posed a credible military threat, with the notable exception of the missile crisis. America’s stated motives, from “civilizing” to “containment,” have long been rhetorical tools to smooth a less publicly palatable interest, the bitter aftertaste of which plays a significant role in Latin American politics.

Who is in charge in Latin America right now? All that is up for change is the coming year as twelve countries hold elections. Chile recently elected its first female president, Socialist Michelle Bachelet, on January 15. In December, Bolivia’s first indigenous president, Evo Morales (an Aymara Indian), was elected following the ousting of his two predecessors by Bolivians protesting endemic corruption and poverty. Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez is perhaps the most controversial figure in Latin American politics right now, with a talent for provoking the Bush Administration, while Brazil’s president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has proven to be more moderate. With the exception of Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru, all the South American countries have left-leaning governments and in Central America, Mexico will likely join this group, come the July elections.

So why are those who craft foreign policy in Washington so concerned about its largely poverty-stricken neighbors? Because Latin America has things America wants, of course: oil, natural gas, coal, and plantations that export cheap fruits and vegetables to the United States. This is why, for most of the twentieth century, the United States pushed for capitalist-friendly (and rarely democratic) regimes in Central and South America and why it feared the socialist nationalization of industries, natural resource extraction, and land reform projects. Simply put, American doctrine was (and is) that state-controlled industries are bad. The more control Bolivia exerts over its natural gas resources (the second largest in Latin America), the less the United States will be able to access and dominate the market.

But after nearly a century of trying to impose our ideas through influencing and intervening in Latin American politics, the United States is faced with countries whose recent histories have been tumultuous, to say the least—marred by political violence, mass killings, dictatorial regimes, economic crises and unstable governments. This atmosphere certainly isn’t conducive to stable trading relationships.

Given this history, does the U.S. have anything to fear from leftist governments in Latin America? Probably not. Leaders such as Brazil’s Lula and Argentina’s Kirchner have been trying to address poverty and economic problems through socialist means while maintaining domestic political compromise and important trade links with the United States. Chavez has been able to impose his policies more quickly without political opposition, but his ultimate goals are similar. Given U.S. agricultural subsidies, the threat of capital outflows, and the failure of the American-prescribed neoliberal economics, South American leaders are wary of any potential loss of economic autonomy. In the’80s and ’90s, many Latin American countries followed the “Washington consensus” required to secure IMF loans and implemented neo-liberalist free trade policies, only to see their economies become volatile and eventually collapse. Recovering from U.S.-prescribed shock therapy, leaders in Latin America realize that what is most important is economic stability—a stability that has evaded them so far. They realize the need for regulation and ownership of domestic resources, and the need for foreign investment. The result of this difficult situation is that leaders are trying to come up with a compromise—to allow foreign investment that benefits the national economy instead of capital that flows through and leaves little behind or destabilizes the economy. Whether or not the Bush administration realizes this, Latin American leaders have—the American way is not the only way.

Although Morales has been involved in sometimes violent protests for the legal growing of coca plants and has advocated nationalizing the nation’s natural gas industry, in the first month of his presidency he’s been more of a pragmatist than the radical left-wing U.S. media proclaimed him to be. Bolivia’s monetarist policy, a positive leftover from the ’90s, is still largely intact, and Morales is making no moves to change it. Bachelet of Chile isn’t making drastic changes either—in her victory speech she assured the international community that “we will continue to walk the same road,” maintaining Chile’s free-market economy. Such assurances are vital, and slowly the international financial community is learning that the left can be trustworthy. These recent elections have not been followed by a massive pullout of investment such as that seen in Brazil after Lula’s election in 2002.

This does not mean that Latin American leaders are accepting the status quo. Many are making significant changes within and among their countries. In’91, Brazil, Chile, Argentina and Paraguay formed Mercosur, a trade bloc that promotes free, fair, and mutually beneficial trade and movement of currency, goods, and aid, which has grown to include most South American countries. Mercosur also merged with another trade bloc, the Andean Community, to form the South American Community of Nations, a European Union-like regional bloc. There are also domestic changes taking place. Upon assuming the presidency in’98, Hugo Chavez started nationalizing oil wells and tightening state control over the economy. Venezuela still provides a significant portion of U.S. oil, with Chavez even providing subsidized home heating oil to poor U.S. households in the Bronx, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and soon New Hampshire.

Morales is making moves towards the nationalization of Bolivia’s natural gas industry, the revenues of which have long been beyond th
e reach of Bolivia’s leaders. But Morales will only follow Chavez’s more radical lead if he has to—the more diplomatically and economically isolated the U.S. makes Bolivia, the higher the unemployment and more radical social unrest that Morales must contend with. Case in point: during the Bolivian elections a key American diplomat made it clear that if Morales were elected, the United States would pull aid from the country. Morales’s approval rating soared. If the United States keeps its cool, however, Bolivians could have time to create the framework for sustainable growth across all income levels, a prospect that requires a departure from Bolivia’s recent history of short-lived governments. Iran’s president might be lauding Morales’s election, but it is the U.S. that has the real power to keep stability and moderation in Bolivia.

Morales has been watching the successes and failures around Bolivia and has reassured Bolivia’s trading partners that he does not want to see an end to foreign influence and investment in Bolivia—he only wants Bolivia to get a greater share of the revenues and autonomy over usage of the revenue. For Bolivians, who have the second largest natural gas reserves in South America and the second poorest population in the western hemisphere, Morales’s plan hardly seems radical.

More autonomy for Latin America may at first seem contradictory to American interests, but peaceful relationships with countries such as Bolivia and Venezuela—instead of antagonistic back-and-forth exchanges with their leaders—may be the way to go for the United States, at least for now. As each nation demands its right to experience the growth and development enjoyed by the first world, the policies of neo-colonialism have been surely rejected. Growing faith in self-determination, the failure of old economic dogmatism, and the self-moderating effect of growing democracies in Latin America have created a new political and economic climate. Latin America still has hurdles in its path, but the future looks bright. The U.S. no longer enjoys a monopoly in declaring the “right path,” and continued fear of deviation from that path is unjustified and outdated hyperbole. Abandoning antagonism and respecting socialist domestic policy will ensure that the rising tide of trade lifts all boats.