hen the opponents of the incitement of hatred and the proponents of unchecked free speech abut in the public sphere, sparks inevitably fly. Those who see free speech as indivisible have over the years transformed the right into the highest altar of worship in the land of democracy. Unadulterated free speech advocates are vociferous and mainstream in American society; to go against them is to slaughter the unassailable sacred cow. The fact remains that a number of other free societies have determined that even the right of expression, undoubtedly a vital right, is subject to the reasonable limitations of a free and democratic society.
Have these societies snowballed towards repressive fascist regimes outlawing the rights of press and speech? Unless you are inclined to refer to America’s benign northern neighbor as such, the answer is an emphatic no. Public incitement of hatred is a criminal code offense in Canada. A Canadian Supreme Court benchmark on the issue validated the legislation enacting the offense. The court ruled that “substantial harm” demonstrably flows from hate propaganda, as evinced by the “collective historical knowledge of the potentially catastrophic effects of the promotion of hatred.” The court found there to be an obvious “rational connection” between the ban on hate propaganda and “fostering harmonious social relations in a community dedicated to equality and multiculturalism.”
What does such a proscription on the public incitement of hatred achieve? It effectively declares the society’s outright opprobrium for the content of messages of hate. Such laws establish that attempts to disseminate hatred are wholly contradictory with the values of a society embracing equality and recognizing the worth and dignity of every person. Pluralist societies stressing equality and liberty for every individual, regardless of race or creed, are indeed able to objectively reject hatred on the grounds that it is incompatible with the society’s fundamental values. Complicity with hateful speech indicates that individuals within a particular identifiable group do not have the same inherent dignity, equality, and rights as other citizens, that they are lesser human beings. These laws objectively declare that such attempts at disenfranchisement do not accord with the society’s principles.
So what of the slippery slope? First of all, the standards by which these laws are applied are and must be stringent in terms of scope and evidentiary requirements. It’s not possible to delve into the legal intricacies of these in this short opinion piece. Secondly, the contention that the rights of bigots must be protected in order to safeguard the rights of good and tolerant citizens is a bald-faced lie. Laws against hate dissemination sanction individuals encroaching on the rights of others, and going against the principles underpinning the society they live within. Beyond hatred, laws that reasonably limit speech, such as those concerning libel and slander, exist in almost every liberal democracy.
The reasonable limitation of banning hate speech is premised in large part on the same principles as slander or libel laws. Individuals deserve protection from undue vilification in the public sphere; by transference, aggregates of individuals in an identifiable group deserve this same protection. If I publish an article in the United States that falsely claims that Mr. X is a dirty disease-carrying public menace, existing libel laws would harshly sanction me. If I was to write an article falsely declaring that all members of Mr. X’s identifiable group (racial, religious etc.) are dirty disease-carrying public menaces, I would be left alone. In both instances I have falsely claimed that Mr. X is a dirty virus-carrying public menace.
That the law that would sanction me in the first instance is generally perceived as benign. The specter of sanctioning me for the second action, which effectively is doing the same thing to Mr. X, is decried as an attack on everything that is fundamentally American. In my mind the distinction is intellectually faulty—I denigrate Mr. X no less flagrantly in the second instance, therefore I should be held similarly culpable.
Inciting hatred contributes nothing to the aspirations of citizens in a liberal and free democracy. It does not bring society closer to a greater truth, it does not promote greater individual development, nor does it protect or foster the flourishing democracy that welcomes all to participate. Instead, hate propagates lies and falsehoods (which as history attests have the danger of being accepted as truths), and aims at delegitimizing the participation of key groups of society in the public sphere. Banning the incitement of hatred presents a minimal impairment of the freedom of expression in the modern liberal democratic state which concurrently pledges to foster and defend the free and equal participation of all it citizens.
